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ABSTRACT A relevant share of the theoretical and empirical analysis on economic
growth has been devoted to finding a specific role for international trade in reinforcing
countries’ growth rates. Not as much attention has been dedicated to the role of sectoral
composition of export in influencing the effect of trade on income convergence. In this
paper we look at this issue along the line of research on multiple regimes and
convergence clubs, considering how openness and similarity in export composition
among countries can induce convergence in income levels among the same countries. We
apply our analysis to the catching-up of income levels of Central and Eastern Europe
Countries to the EU benchmark. We explicitly consider the sectoral export patterns of
the CEECs by comparing them to those of the 15 old members of the EU, focusing on
countries’ specialization as suppliers for the EU market. Our main result is that
similarity in export composition has a positive, significant and nonlinear impact on
catching-up. Results are robust to controlling for openness and country-size and for
investment, schooling, and the quality of institutions.
KEY WORDS: CEECs, transition, growth, semiparametrics
Introduction
In this paper, we examine the much-debated relationship between trade and
economic growth from a specific viewpoint: the role of export composition
in fostering convergence between a group of trading countries.
A wide range of theoretical approaches – from post-Keynesian models of
trade and growth to endogenous growth models – suggest that the link
between a country’s growth rates and its level of openness hinges on the
characteristics of the country’s trade pattern. But in spite of the suggestions
coming from theoretical models, most of the empirical literature limits the
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analysis to the effect of aggregate openness indicators on growth. Here we
try to partially fill the gap between the theoretical propositions and the
empirical analysis, by explicitly considering trade structure as a determinant
of growth. More specifically, we test whether different or similar export
compositions affect the speed of catching-up, on the basis that more than
openness per se, what should matter for convergence is a country’s export
pattern relative to its main partners.
The empirical exercise focuses on the recent EU enlargement to the
Central-Eastern European countries (CEECs). This integration process
displays interesting dynamics both in terms of GDP and trade structures.
Since the very early phases of transition, the CEECs opened up significantly
to trade, especially toward the EU1 changing sharply both the geographic
and sector orientation of their trade flows. Such a change was not uniform,
bringing about different trade structures among the CEECs. Eventually, the
CEECs also experienced a catching up process toward the EU income levels,
even if the distance from the 15 older EU member countries is, in this
respect, still very large.
The observation that the countries moving toward the EU trade structure
are among the most advanced ones both in terms of their transition process
and per capita income levels and in terms of their institutional integration
with the EU leads to the hypothesis of a correlation between convergence in
export composition and convergence in income levels. Testing such
hypothesis is the aim of this paper. In the next section we suggest how
similarity in export composition and income convergence may be linked,
while the section after defines the similarity index used in the analysis and
presents the empirical evidence for the EU and the CEECs on openness and
convergence. The fourth section contains the econometric results of the
multivariate parametric and semiparametric regressions, and discusses
robustness issues and the evidence of nonlinearity in the partial effect of
similarity in export composition on income convergence. The fifth section
concludes.
How are Trade Structure and Income Dynamics Related?
After a wave of empirical literature on openness and growth, which was
largely anecdotal and used very simple cross-country estimation techniques,
the work developed in the 1990s tried to address some of the shortcomings
of the previous literature, establishing the link between trade and growth on
firmer grounds. The papers by Dollar (1992), Sachs and Warner (1995),
Edwards (1998), Frankel and Romer (1999) are just a sample of the studies
finding a positive relation between openness indicators and growth rates
amplifying the consensus on the positive effect of trade on growth.
But this more recent wave of literature was heavily disputed too, on the
basis that the empirical results were not robust to changes in the time period
or group of countries being analyzed. The use of different indicators was
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criticized, as it implicitly assumes different mechanisms through which trade
influences economic performance, without explicitly addressing this
important point (Hallak & Levinsohn, 2004). Part of the literature linking
trade and growth rates sees openness as inversely related to distortions in the
economy, and as an indicator of the correct functioning of the market and
price mechanism, leading to suitable investment decisions and therefore to
growth (Baldwin, 2004). While this mechanism could be very relevant,
especially in many less developed countries, the openness indicators may in
fact capture a range of different and deeper effects. The main point of the
criticism to the use of an array of aggregate openness indicators is the
‘. . . suspect that the relationship is a contingent one, dependent on a host of
country and external characteristics’ (Rodriguez & Rodrik, 2000) which are
not correctly captured by the analysis.
A closer look to the theoretical models shows that countries’ inter-
dependence affects growth patterns and the nature and speed of convergence
in more fundamental ways. As stressed by the works of Slaughter (1997) and
Ventura (1997), trade impacts on growth and convergence paths by affecting
factors’ prices, and therefore factors’ accumulation. Such an impact depends
on a country’s situation with respect to its trading partners, and different
circumstances may well bring about different dynamic effects. One of these
circumstances is a country’s specialization and trade structure. In order to
link trade structure and convergence, Slaughter (1997) decomposes per
capita income convergence into a ‘factor price effect’ and ‘factor endowment
effect’’, as simple accounting shows that per capita income is a combination
of both factor prices and factor quantities. Both the order of magnitude and
the sign of such effects are sensitive to trade patterns.
This is where we take off, focusing on the different effects on growth rates
and convergence of different trade structures. We look at convergence along
the line of research on multiple regimes and club convergence opened by
Durlauf and Johnson (1995) and Quah (1997), and surveyed in Durlauf and
Quah (1999) and in Durlauf (2003). As for trade and income convergence,
we move from the analyses of Slaughter (1997) and from the approach of
Ben-David and Loewy (1998), explicitly considering how similarity in trade
structure, measured by export sectoral composition, can induce convergence
in income levels among countries through different channels suggested by
the economic theory on growth.
The first channel links similarity in trade structure and productivity
improvements, as trade in similar or identical industries allows exploiting
different externalities that can positively affect growth rates. Technological
and knowledge spillovers are unlikely to affect all sectors evenly (van de
Klundert & Smulders, 1996) and are more likely to occur within the same or
technologically similar industries. Therefore, the scope for international
technological spillovers is enhanced if trade structures overlap. Intra-
industry trade exploits economies of scale, enhancing productivity, which
can accelerate the growth rate along the transition path. Production sharing
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and processing trade – very important phenomena in the EU–CEECs trade
relations – increase the likelihood of spillovers and the access to advanced
technology by the CEECs. Similar export patterns can also increase average
productivity through increased competition for the firms involved, as
suggested by Ben-David and Kimhi (2000). Stronger competition, both at
home and abroad, makes the absorption of foreign knowledge and ideas
crucial, and allows only the more productive firms to survive. If this is the
case, it might not be trade per se that matters if there is no overlap in
specialization. Instead, similar export patterns will increase competition
between countries, enhancing the positive competition effects. The effects of
increased productivity are directly connected to factors accumulation. If
growth and convergence are driven by factors accumulation and incentives
to accumulate depend on returns and prices (Young, 1991; Ventura, 1997),
similar trade specialization brings about a similar incentive structure and
can enhance convergence.
The second channel connecting export similarity and convergence
enhances the demand-side effects, somehow along the lines first suggested
by Linder (1961) and more recently developed by Markusen (1986). The
positive effects of trade on growth rates rely to a large extent on trade
volumes to exploit the scale effects built in endogenous growth models
(Rivera-Batiz & Romer, 1991). Therefore, the positive consequences of
trade are more likely to take place if the goods exported by a country are
matched by a large and growing demand in its export market. If similarity in
trade structures reflects this matching of supply and demand, which
enhances the (static and dynamic) gains from trade, a lagging country can
speed up its catching-up process if its trade structure becomes more similar
to the one of advanced countries, as this will expand the opportunities
offered by trade.
Finally, there is a third channel connecting export similarity and catching-
up. The economic literature shows that specialization patterns have a sizable
effect on business cycle transmission between countries: countries with
stronger trade linkages tend to have more highly correlated business cycles,
and differences in production patterns imply different degrees of exposure to
common sectoral stochastic developments (Imbs, 1999, 2004; Kose & Yi,
2006). In this perspective, for a country having an export composition
similar to the one of its trading partners means being similarly exposed to
business cycle phases and to shocks, reducing the amount of divergence
factors and possibly enhancing convergence.
In spite of these theoretical suggestions, very few studies explicitly
consider the role of trade structure in determining countries’ growth and
catching-up. A difficulty in performing this kind of empirical test is in
finding a good representation of the trade structure comparable across
countries, and in linking a measure of disaggregated trade flows to aggregate
macroeconomic variables. The few existing works consider the role of
concentration versus diversification of exports (Imbs & Wacziarg, 2003), or
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exports of agricultural goods and raw materials (Sachs & Warner, 1999), to
test the risk-exposure-and-growth hypothesis (Lederman & Maloney, 2003).
Feenstra and Rose (2000) find a strong relation between what they call
advanced export structures and high productivity levels and fast growth
rates, having in mind the trade-productivity-growth link. Crespo Cuaresma
and Wo¨rz (2005) test whether exports in technology intensive industries
have a higher potential for positive externalities, and they find a significant
effect in the case of developing countries. Bensidoun et al. (2001) also find
that the growth effects of trade depend on the type of products countries are
specialized in, and in particular what matters is the adaptation of
specialization patterns to the dynamic of international demand. In general,
when a trade structure variable is considered, the empirical evidence
confirms what the theory suggests, that trade structure – rather, or at least
more precisely, than trade per se – can affect income convergence between
countries (Rodrik et al., 2005).
GDP Growth, Openness and Trade Structure Dynamics
Catching-up and Transition in the CEECs
The specific contribution of this paper is that – rather than trying to assess
whether a specific trade structure is enhancing or hampering the catching-up
process – we test whether having a similar export composition brings about
income convergence within a group of countries. In other words, we assume
that a particular trade structure can influence positively or negatively
convergence relatively to the group of countries you are converging to.
Therefore we choose and define carefully the sample of countries we want to
examine. Emphasizing similarities and referring to a benchmark specific for
the countries selected made up by the main export market allows us to
refrain from using a sector classification that arbitrarily divides exporting
sectors into groups with different impacts on growth rates and convergence.
We focus our attention on the process of economic integration between
the CEECs and the EU, because this case presents a number of interesting
characteristics. The liberalization of trade flows between the CEECs and the
EU was pursued immediately after the collapse of the centralized systems in
central Europe and played a key role in the integration process of the area.
Even in the very early phases of transition, when experiencing negative GDP
growth rates, the CEECs shifted their trade structures to a remarkable
extent, unobserved in non-transition economies, both in terms of exporting
industries and in terms of trading partners (Landesmann, 2003). The EU
quickly became their main export market, as the CEECs and the EU signed
the so-called Europe Agreements in the early 1990s, starting a process of
preferential trade liberalization and phasing out of their reciprocal tariffs.
These agreements eventually led to the application of the CEECs for EU
membership.
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For the CEECs, the EU represented a natural target also in terms of
standards of living, but not surprisingly the catching-up process of the
CEECs in terms of growth and income levels was more difficult and required
the transition to be more advanced. It was only in the mid-1990s that the
CEECs’ economies reverted to positive growth rates and started to converge
toward the EU both in terms of productivity and in terms of per capita
income. Since then, on average the CEECs’ GDP growth rates were higher
than the EU members’ growth rates.
The convergence process was very uneven across countries, as their per
capita income levels compared to the EU average show (see Table 1). If we
measure the CEECs income per capita in purchasing power standards
relative to the EU-15 average income per capita, we observe a positive trend
in the second half of the 1990s for most of them, showing that the gap has
been gradually narrowing. The catching-up appears especially fast for
Slovenia, followed by Slovakia, two countries with very different starting
points. Slovakia was in the poorest countries’ group, having in 1993 an
income per capita equal to 37.7 per cent of the EU average, while Slovenia
was at 58.2 per cent, ranking very close to the top. The path followed by the
Czech Republic, which in 1993 had the income level closest to the EU
average (60.8 per cent) among the CEECs, is very irregular. Bulgaria and
Romania, ranking at the bottom of the group in 1993, show a positive trend
toward the EU average income only from 1997 onward.
These differences reflect a number of factors, such as the macroeconomic
policies followed in the transition period, different investment (both
domestic and foreign) rates, different rates of technological catching-up,
Table 1. GDP per capita and average annual catch-up rate for the CEECs
GDP per capita
(EU15¼ 100)
Average annual catch-up rate for the CEECs
(%)
1993 2002 1993 – 2002 1993 – 97 1998 – 2002
Bulgaria 27.9 26.4 0.21 1.18 70.77
Czech Republic 60.8 61.9 70.31 71.27 0.65
Estonia 30.6 40.1 71.61 71.64 71.58
Hungary 44.7 53.4 71.7 70.47 72.93
Latvia 26.6 34.8 70.61 0.47 71.69
Lithuania 33.2 39.1 0.08 1.80 71.64
Poland 34.6 41.7 71.36 72.28 70.44
Romania 25.8 26.5 70.17 70.25 70.09
Slovakia 37.7 47.1 72.03 72.55 71.50
Slovenia 58.2 69.0 73.45 73.87 73.03
Notes: A negative catch-up rate indicates that the income gap between a country and the EU
average is falling while a positive rate means that this gap is widening. The catch-up rate is
calculated as
[(GDPit7GDPet)7(GDPi(t7 1)7GDPe(t7 1))]/(GDPi(t7 1)/GDPe(t7 1))6 100
where GDPit is the level of GDP per capita in PPS for country i at time t and GDPet is the
average value for EU15. See also European Commission (2004), ch.2.
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affected by the country’s skill endowment and absorption capacity. But the
different growth rates might also reflect differences in the industrial structure
and in the weight of sectors having different dynamics in productivity.
As far as openness, with few exceptions, the CEECs are classified as open
economies since 1990 – 92. In their updating of the Sachs and Warner (1995)
openness indicator, Wacziarg and Welch (2003) classify only Estonia and
Romania as closed economies. This classification does not follow uniquely
from the CEECs’ tariff levels, which are differentiated, going from an
average of about 17 per cent for Bulgaria to 1 per cent for Estonia.
Considering other openness indicators, such as the import and export flows
over GDP, all the CEECs appear to be very open to trade, with the smallest
economies being naturally the most open. However, for these countries, the
comparable aggregate openness indicators hide large differences in export
composition.
Defining Similarity in Trade Structures
As mentioned, we do not want to limit the analysis to the link between
aggregate openness indicators and income convergence. Instead, we want to
emphasize the role of specific trade structures on growth. The existing
literature shows that the CEECs trade patterns changed quite dramatically
since the early phases of transition: the CEECs’ export structure has moved in
different directions, with some countries quickly upgrading their specializa-
tion, while other countries are lagging behind (Landesmann, 2003). Normally,
evidence on changes in trade structures is presented through a large number of
indicators and presenting an array of sectoral specialization indices, but it is
not straightforward to find a suitable description of such complex changes
with a measure that can be used in empirical exercises. Following De
Benedictis and Tajoli (2007), we build an index of changes in export
composition for ten CEECs: Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary,
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, the Slovak Republic, and Slovenia.
We examine the evolution of trade similarity over time – from 1993 to
2002 – measuring the distance of a country’s export composition from a
given benchmark, using sectors’ export shares. We define a self-similarity
index (how the export composition of an EU member-to-be has changed
with respect to the beginning of the transition process) and EU-similarity
index (if and how the export composition of an EU member-to-be has
changed with respect to the EU export composition), using the Bray-Curtis
distance index defined as:2
dxy ¼
P
i
xi " yij jP
i
xi þ yið Þ
where x and y are two different countries identified by n sectoral export
shares (the value of exports in sector i over the value of total exports), given
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by xi and yi. To move from the Bray-Curtis distance index to a similarity
measure we take
sxy ¼ 1" dxy
where if sxy¼ 1 the export patterns are identical and if sxy¼ 0 the patterns
show no overlap. In defining EU-similarity, country x is a CEEC and y is
the EU benchmark; in defining self-similarity, country x is a CEEC
considered at any subsequent time period and y is always the initial year
considered, 1993.
The self-similarity and EU-similarity indices for the CEECs are presented
in Figure 1, where self-similarity is measured along the vertical axis and EU-
similarity along the horizontal axis. The starting point, 1993, is for each
country at the top of the figure, depicted by a labeled square, and the length
of the vertical segments indicate how much the country changed its export
composition with respect to 1993. Every circle indicates a subsequent year.
If the line progressively moves rightward, the country’s export composition
becomes more similar to the EU export composition, with a value of 1 of the
index showing perfect overlap in exports’ composition.
Figure 1. CEECs self-similarity and EU-similarity, 1993 – 2002. Source: Authors’
elaborations on Eurostat Comext database
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The figure shows remarkable differences across countries, in both the
similarity dimensions examined. The three Baltic republics represent a group
on their own, as their export composition has changed the most since 1993.
These countries in 1993 were very different from the EU both in terms of
exports and of income per capita, but while they show very little or no
convergence toward the EU in terms of exports, with respect to income their
catching up was remarkable, even if a large gap still persists. Romania and
Bulgaria instead are the countries whose export composition changed the
least in the past decade, and following a very irregular path. Bulgaria also
shows divergence in its export composition with respect to the EU, and
Romania shows some convergence only in the last few years. The remaining
five countries overall changed their export composition in the EU direction,
even if to quite different extents. Poland is the country that converged the
most toward the EU export composition and it is now the most similar
country in this respect. Hungary instead followed a very irregular path, like
Slovakia, even if the two countries had different starting points both in
terms of export composition and income. For this converging group,
convergence in the export composition seems to slow down in the last years.
Summing up, there is no generalized trend in the changes observed in the
export composition, confirming that the CEECs followed different paths in
restructuring their economies, just like they recorded different macroeco-
nomic performances.
The observation of the data on GDP growth rates of the CEECs together
with Figure 1 is suggestive of a possible relationship between converging
trade structures and income convergence: the countries whose exports’ paths
are less convergent toward the EU are also the countries lagging behind in
terms of incomes. The existence of such a relationship can be properly
explored and should be tested empirically, to test its robustness and the
possibility of observing a spurious relation affected by other factors, and to
infer a possible direction of causality.
Kernels, Bivariate Densities and Multiple Regimes
An efficient way of extracting information on the structural characteristics
of the variables under scrutiny and on their evolution along time is to follow
Quah (1997) in the use of kernel densities. Since we want to emphasize if and
how trade openness and the similarity of sectoral export composition to the
EU are linked to per capita GDP changes, we analyze the joint distribution
of openness, and of EU-similarity, and per capita GDP.
Figure 2 plots several estimated kernel densities mapping the bivariate
distribution of pooled per capita GDP of the CEECs with respect to
openness and EU-similarity. In the upper part of Figure 2, the two-
dimensional kernels show two main modes oriented at the edges of the per
capita GDP spectrum, more or less at the same level of openness. A third
minor mode depicts a group of observations with a joint distribution defined
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Figure 2. Kernel densities, multiple regimes and conditional convergence. Source:
Authors’ elaborations on Eurostat data
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by intermediate levels of per capita GDP and a very low level of openness.
As for as the joint distribution of per capita GDP and EU-similarity, a clear
positive relationship emerges. It is represented by a three-modal distribu-
tion, where the modes identify three groups of observations characterized
respectively by a relative low per capita GDP and a relative low EU-
similarity, a medium per capita GDP and a medium EU-similarity, and an
high per capita GDP and an high EU-similarity. The modes are however not
perfectly aligned along the main diagonal, inducing the suspicion of a
nonlinear relation between the two variables.
Figure 2. (Continued)
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The central part of the same figure illustrates an alternative form of
displaying through contours the bivariate density estimates shown in the
first row.3 In the case of openness, the contour-plot shows the bimodality of
the joint-distribution and gives evidence of a relevant aspect of the data:
‘rich’ countries have a level of openness above 100, while ‘poor’ countries
have a level of openness that ranges all along the spectrum of the variable.
From a global point of view, no clear relationship emerges. In the case of
EU-similarity, the contour-plot shows a clearer path: the relation is positive,
with some evidence of nonlinearity. The relation between these variables is
better characterized by using a regression function, as will be shown in the
following section.
The contour-plot can be used to show how the bivariate distributions have
changed over time. After dividing the data into two groups of observations,
one for the years between 1993 and 1997, and the second one for the years
1998 – 2002, we plotted and compared density estimates for the two time
periods identified above. This is done in the bottom part of Figure 2. The
shape of each density estimate is defined by two contours containing 75 per
cent and 25 per cent of the observations, and the two densities are
superimposed to show the evolution of the three variables over the decade.
The dynamics of the openness kernel density shows an upward shift of the
joint distribution, a third mode appears, displaying the emergence of a
number of country-observations with a per capita GDP around 50 per cent
of the EU average and with a level of openness close to 150. In terms of
EU-similarity, the main change emerging in the late 1990s is a double or
‘twin peaks’ regime: the evidence of two different clubs of countries
characterized by very different levels of per capita GDP and EU-similarity
is remarkable, and so are the changes observed in the group of countries
converging toward the EU in terms of per capita GDP and EU-similarity.
We will also test these dynamics in a multivariate regression framework in
the next section.
Econometric Results
The Starting Point
The basic expression of the regression we estimate for the ten CEECs over
the period 1993 – 2003 to test the role of openness and similarity in trade
structures in the catching-up process is the following:
lnGDPjt ¼ b0 þ b1 lnEU-similarityjt þ b2 lnSELF-similarityjt
þ b3 ln opennessjt þXjt gþ ujt ð1Þ
where GDPjt is per capita GDP measured in purchasing power standards in
percentage of the average EU income per capita. This variable measures
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directly the catching-up process, and the increase in its value indicates that
the gap is narrowing.
EU-similarityjt, which is our main variable of interest, is the sxy index
measuring the similarity between the CEECs and the EU export
composition, and an increase in this index indicates that the trade structures
are becoming more similar. If our hypothesis that similarities in export
composition can foster the catching up process through the different
channels discussed in the second section, the correlation between the two
measures should be positive.
Self-similarityjt is the index of self-similarity, which should capture the
extent of the changes in the CEECs’ export composition with respect to their
export composition in 1993, the earliest year of transition included in the
dataset. Larger changes in the export composition are measured by a lower
value of the self-similarity index. A rapid catching-up process could be
correlated with a sharp change in the export composition in the case of the
CEECs (in our variable with a lower self-similarity). In fact, moving from
centralized planning to a market economy, they should be able to better
exploit their comparative advantages and change their specialization. Here it
is more difficult to anticipate the sign of the relation, because even if it
should be negative in the long run (greater changes and lower self-similarity
correlated with catching-up), industrial restructuring and resource realloca-
tion in the short run could entail high adjustment costs, with ambiguous
effects on the GDP growth rate.
opennessjt stands for openness. In the analysis we use two different aggre-
gate measures of openness, the Sachs and Warner (1995) index,4 updated by
Wacziarg and Welch (2003), or alternatively the trade (Exportsþ Imports)
share of GDP (trade share), measured in purchasing power standards.
Xjt is a matrix of other covariates influencing the catching-up rate.
Finally, ujt is an i.i.d. error term. All variables are measured in natural logs
in order to facilitate comparisons of partial effects.
Regression results are reported in Table 2. Our base regression only
considers EU-similarity and self-similarity as covariates. It confirms the
expected positive sign of the correlation between catching-up in income and
increased similarity in EU–CEECs trade structure, and the positive
correlation between changes in export composition and catching-up in
incomes, here shown by a negative sign of the coefficient. The EU-similarity
coefficient is significant at the 99 per cent level. Even if the two variables
explain 60 per cent of the variance of GDP, and the F-test is largely
significant, certainly this regression suffers from an omitted variables bias,
as income changes depend on a number of different factors not included in
the basic functional form. Notwithstanding, these first results are encoura-
ging in indicating that the trade structure might not be irrelevant in affecting
the catching-up process.
In columns 2 and 3 of Table 2 we add the two openness indices previously
defined. The Sachs and Warner – Wacziarg and Welch index (SW-WW) is a
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dummy, whose coefficient is positive and significant. Its introduction in the
regression improves the fit in a minor way, leaving the coefficients of the other
covariates virtually unchanged. Only self-similarity reduces its significance.
When we substitute the SW-WW dummy with trade share the coefficient
increases and the fit of the regression improves. The self-similarity coefficient
becomes however statistically insignificant once controlling for the degree of
openness with the trade share variable. The loss of significance of the self-
similarity variable, while EU-similarity maintains its own, corroborates the
conjecture that it is not a change in the export composition per se that matters
for catching-up, but that the direction of change is what matters most.
Adding Controls: Investment, Schooling, Institution and Size
To overcome the missing variable bias and test for the robustness of this
relation, in regressions (4) and (5) we introduce some control variables that in
the empirical literature are normally associated with growth. The sign and
the significance of the variables in our control group are as expected. The
share of investments over GDP, the percentage of population with secondary
education in 1993 and the quality of institutions (here measured using the
1999 EBRD transition index (EBRD, 2000)) are all usually positively
Table 2. Pooled data regressions. Dependent variable is country’s per capita GDP
relative to EU15 per capita GDP
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Intercept 4.15 3.99 3.09 10.14 12.83
(0.05) (0.77) (0.26) (1.79) (1.60)
EU-similarity 0.792 0.736 0.761 0.744 0.545
(0.06) (0.065) (0.06) (0.054) (0.058)
Self-similarity 70.218 70.202 70.076 0.007 0.037
(0.083) (0.081) (0.085) (0.067) (0.058)
Gross capital formation 0.458 0.411
(0.074) (0.064)
Schooling 0.233 0.31
(0.076) (0.067)
Institutions 1.2
(0.206)
Openness (SW-WW) 0.14
(0.051)
Openness (trade share) 0.234 71.303 72.214
(0.058) (0.385) (0.366)
Population 70.686 71.108
(0.184) (0.174)
Openness6population 0.118 0.213
(0.039) (0.037)
Observations 100 100 100 100 100
!e 0.2 0.194 0.186 0.136 0.117
Adj. R2 0.606 0.631 0.659 0.818 0.864
F 77.2 57.51 64.96 64.59 80.09
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. All variables are in natural logs.
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associated with a higher speed of catching-up. In our regression they
indeed appear positive and significant, and they improve the fit of the
regression.
The introduction of these control variables changes the sign of the
openness variable, which appears to be less robustly related to convergence
than trade structure. Holding constant the value of other covariates,
openness per se shows a negative and significant impact on catching-up. This
is an important feature of our countries’ data. In general, openness –
measured by the share of exports and imports over GDP – could just
capture the role played by the size of a country in its growth process
(Alesina et al., 2005), so it is necessary to disentangle the two different
effects, examining the possible interaction among the two variables.
Therefore, measuring country size with population and taking it as a the
moderator variable and openness as the moderated variable, in the last two
columns of Table 2 we show that the direct effect of openness on the process
of catching-up is negative, when the size of the country is small, while the
interaction of the two variables foster convergence. Larger open countries
do catch-up faster and the quality of institutions enhances this process.
The introduction of the EBRD index as a measure of the quality of
institutions has two more effects on the coefficients of other covariates, it
reduces the role of similarity (EU-similarity remains significant but its
coefficient shrinks, while self-similarity looses its significance) and increases
the one of openness and population. Once controlling for the quality of
institutions, openness by itself is influencing even more negatively income
convergence in small countries, while when controlling for the size of the
country the opposite is true.
Robustness
In regressions (6) and (7) in Table 3, we test for the presence of outliers. Two
of them – Latvia and Lithuania in 1993 – were identified by Cook’s test and
excluded. Results are qualitatively the same but the fit of the regression
improves.
As a further control of these results we modify our specification by
introducing countries’ dummies to control for unobserved countries’
characteristics resulting in a different intercept for every different country
in our panel.5 In regression (8), the use of countries’ dummies reduces the
effect of EU-similarity, makes the self-similarity coefficient significant and
therefore considerably improves the goodness of fit. However, this
procedure can also introduce potential problems of multicollinearity with
the time invariant factor variables of schooling and institutions.6
After having checked for non-normally distributed errors, collinearity,
and heteroskedasticity the information conveyed by regression (8) is that
our main result is fully confirmed: the index of EU similarity is always
positive and significant.
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In regressions (9), (10) and (11) we also address the problem of
simultaneity between openness and income levels (Frenkel & Romer, 1999)
by instrumenting openness via a one-period lag in a two-stages least-
squares regression with robust standard errors. Since one could suspect
that EU-similarity and self-similarity may also be endogenous to various
degrees, we instrumented them analogously. No relevant changes in the
parameter estimates or in their significance has been noticed,7 and the
results are confirmed also when country dummies are introduced in
the regression.
Finally, we also check for the influence that the specific similarity index
used in the analysis could have had on the results of the regression,
substituting the similarity metric derived from the Bray-Curtis distance
index, sxy, with the Pearson linear correlation index.
We run the regression using again a two-stages least-squares estimator,
instrumenting openness, EU-correlation and self-correlation as in the
Table 3. Robustness checks. Dependent variable is country’s per capita GDP relative
to EU15 per capita GDP
OLS OLS OLS IV(b) IV(b) IV(b)
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Intercept 12.18 14.47 14.52 15.55 15.14 18.27
(1.64) (1.44) (1.23) (2.20) (1.84) (2.14)
EU-similarity 0.857 0.664 0.475 0.714 0.512
(0.053) (0.055) (0.057) (0.080) (0.084)
EU-correlation 0.198
(0.029)
Self-similarity 70.151 70.107 70.141 70.177 70.210
(0.067) (0.057) (0.049) (0.088) (0.076)
Self-correlation 70.164
(0.067)
Gross capital formation 0.475 0.426 0.280 0.399 0.261 0.302
(0.066) (0.057) (0.054) (0.049) (0.046) (0.046)
Schooling 0.301 0.363 0.619 0.364 0.631 0.701
(0.069) (0.059) (0.067) (0.056) (0.064) (0.074)
Institutions 1.101 1.651 1.066 1.605 1.680
(0.182) (0.182) (0.234) (0.177) (0.160)
Openness (trade share) 71.706 72.504 72.774 72.704 72.888 73.646
(0.351) (0.325) (0.281) (0.470) (0.377) (0.437)
Population 70.84 71.213 71.385 71.309 71.445 71.787
(0.166) (0.154) (0.135) (0.214) (0.174) (0.198)
Openness6 population 0.147 0.232 0.289 0.252 0.302 0.377
(0.035) (0.033) (0.030) (0.045) (0.037) (0.042)
Country dummies yes yes yes
Observations 98(a) 98(a) 98(a) 90 90 90
!e 0.121 0.102 0.087 0.102 0.088 0.086
Adj. R2 0.857 0.897 0.932 0.907 0.931 0.935
F 84.17 107.2 134.4 143.4 289.34 255.68
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. All variables are in natural logs.
(a) Outliers excluded; (b) 2SLS with robust standard errors, instruments are openness, EU-
similarity and self-similarity lagged one period. In regression (11) instruments are openness,
EU-correlation and self-correlation lagged one period.
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previous cases, and including country dummies. No qualitative change in
the results has been noticed.8
Nonlinearity
The presumption of a nonlinear effect of EU-similarity on convergence
induced by the observation of the characteristics of the contour plot of the
joint distribution of per capita GDP and EU-similarity makes necessary a
supplement of inquiry about the relationship between the two variables.
The first strategy adopted, takes as a starting point the result obtained by
introducing country dummies in the previous regressions. The positive
and significant effect of the dummy confirms the still existing hetero-
geneity of the CEECs once controlling for the influence of the covariates
on GDPjt. Our hypothesis is that the explanation of this remaining
heterogeneity lies in the nonlinearity of the relation between EU-similarity
and GDPjt due to the different behavior of countries at different levels of
EU-similarity.
Therefore, we split the EU-similarity variable into two equally numerous
groups of 49 observations (excluding outliers), defining a dummy variable
indicating a ‘high’ level of EU-similarity or a ‘low’ level of EU-similarity.
We could run regressions of convergence on EU-similarity and openness,
separately for ‘high’ EU-similarity and ‘low’ EU-similarity countries, in
order to test whether the coefficient on the EU-similarity variable is
significantly different from zero, and whether it is significantly more positive
for ‘high’ EU-similarity countries. However, a more efficient way of testing
the robustness of our result is to pool all countries together, and estimate the
following regression equation:
Ln GDPjt ¼ b0 þ b1 lnEU-similarityjt þ b2 lnSelf-similarityjt
þ b3 ln opennesst þ b4 HighEU-similarityjt þXjt gþ ujt ð2Þ
The results of the regression are contained in Table 4, and confirm what we
presumed: the positive and significant coefficients for EU-similarity and
High EU-similarity indicate that a different intercept and a different
marginal slope of the regression are significant and that the relationship
between EU-similarity and the catching-up process is nonlinear.9 This
corroborates the simple evidence of Figure 3 of the existence of a multiple
regime.
It is important to notice that in regression (12) the EU-similarity
coefficient is still positive and significant, as it is the coefficient indicating the
marginal effect of the quality of institutions on GDPjt; however, both
coefficients have been remarkably reduced in size by the introduction of the
EU-similarity dummy in the regression. Such a reduction indicates that, on
the one hand, being similar to the EU in terms of export composition
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matters, but it matters most for the CEECs that are above a certain EU-
similarity threshold. On the other hand, countries highly similar to the EU
export composition are characterized by better institutions.
When the same functional form is estimated using a two-stages least
squares regression with robust standard errors, these results emerge even
more sharply: both coefficients are not significant. The effect of institutions
on GDPjt is entirely caught by the EU similarity dummy, while being similar
to the EU export composition is irrelevant for countries not similar enough
to the same composition of exports.
The limit of regression (12) – and, similarly, of regression (13) – is that
the construction of the High EU-similarity dummy variable is somehow
arbitrary. The selection criteria of halving the observations in two perfectly
proportional groups along the EU-similarity dimension cannot be the most
appropriate one. So we follow Durlauf and Johnson (1995) in extracting
the most appropriate criteria directly from the data itself. Instead of using
a tree-regression approach as in Durlauf and Johnson (1995), we use an
additive semi-parametric regression, as in Liu and Stengos (1999), which
Table 4. Nonlinearity. Dependent variable is country’s per capita GDP relative to
EU15 per capita GDP
OLS IV(b) Spline
(12) (13) (14)
Intercept 11 9.40 8.65
(1.35) (1.83) (1.57)
EU-similarity 0.328 0.203 see Figure 3
(0.073) (0.110)
Self-similarity 70.157 70.329 70.126
(0.049) (0.071) (0.052)
Gross capital formation 0.375 0.229 0.313
(0.049) (0.045) (0.056)
Schooling 0.447 0.571 0.376
(0.052) (0.070) (0.067)
Institutions 0.5 70.030 0.545
(0.184) (0.155) (0.196)
Openness (trade share) 71.695 71.183 71.282
(0.307) (0.388) (0.371)
Population 70.853 70.622 70.638
(0.143) (0.170) (0.175)
Openness6 population 0.159 0.111 0.112
(0.030) (0.034) (0.037)
High EU-similarity dummy 0.308 0.515
(0.051) (0.070)
Observations 98(a) 90 98(a)
!e 0.086 0.071 0.09
Adj. R2 0.926 0.956 0.929
F 136.6 328.62 103.1
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. All variables are in natural logs.
(a) Outliers excluded; (b) 2SLS with robust standard errors, instruments are openness, EU-
similarity and self-similarity lagged one period. In regression 11 instruments are openness, EU-
correlation and self-correlation lagged one period.
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allows us to do some standard inference. The resulting regression
equation is:
Ln GDPjt ¼ b0 þ g ðln EU-similarityjtÞ þ b2 ln self-similarityjt
þ b3 ln opennessjt þXjt gþ ujt ð3Þ
Since we assume only one non-parametric term, the structural form of
equation (3) replicates the partial regression model studied by Robinson
(1988) and Speckman (1988). The only difference with respect to regression
(1) is that the variable EU-similarity does not enter the equation linearly. g
(ln EU-similarity) is an unknown function that in our case takes the form of
a smoothing spline10 (Hastie & Tibshirani, 1999), with the smooth term
modeled using polynomial regression splines.11
Results are included in the last column of Table 4. As for as the partial
effect of EU-similarity on convergence, the result of the semi-parametric
regression is plotted in Figure 3, where the estimated function is the analog
Figure 3. Marginal effect of EU-similarity on catching-up
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of the estimated coefficient in linear regressions. The existence of a multiple
regime is again significant and robust to the introduction of several different
controls. Moving from the left edge of the covariate space, convergence
rapidly increases, flattening down at a second stage, and rising again at high
levels of EU-similarity. With respect to our discussion of the results in
regression (12), now it is perfectly evident that EU-similarity in export
composition seems to be more effective only after a certain threshold is
reached More formally, the Anova test strongly rejected the hypothesis of a
linear marginal effect of EU-similarity on catching-up. The second main
result of our analysis is therefore that similarity in trade structure always
matters for convergence, but as similarity becomes higher the effect on
convergence is magnified. In other words, a multiple regime exists among
the CEECs’ convergence toward the EU’s per capita GDP, and being
similar to the sectoral export composition of EU countries as suppliers for
the EU market seems to be the discriminatory factor separating converging
countries from non-converging ones.
Conclusions
Both empirical evidence and theoretical models suggest that the relationship
between trade and growth might be a contingent one, depending on a host
of specific circumstances. Trade models indicate that different models of
specialization have diversified effects on factors’ prices and therefore factors’
accumulation, suggesting that one of the specific circumstances affecting the
trade and growth relationship might indeed be the patter of trade. In this
paper we test this hypothesis for the case of the CEECs and the EU.
The CEECs have been converging toward the EU income levels during
the 1990s at different speeds. The EU is also the main trade partner of these
countries, and the export flows from these countries toward the EU market
have been increasing, but these flows displayed different characteristics. Our
empirical analysis shows that a measure of export similarity between the
CEECs and the EU is positively and significantly associated with the
convergence process of these countries in terms of income: the CEECs
whose export composition is closer to the EU enjoyed a faster catching-up
process. Results also show that this impact is nonlinear, yet it is robust
controlling for investment, schooling, and the quality of institutions.
Theoretical analyses suggest distinct reasons behind this result, but the
proper mechanism driving the observed link needs to be further explored. In
fact, a closer economic integration might in principle bring about further
changes in trade structures, and affect the convergence path between
countries. This is a very sensitive issue in the integration process. In the EU,
income convergence is one of the main challenges, as wide gaps in income
levels and living standards among members can put strain on the whole
process of European integration. This could also be true in other
circumstances of integration between countries at different stages of
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development. Further research should therefore also consider whether these
results for the CEECs and the EU could be generalized.
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Notes
1 To a large extent, integration though trade flows was achieved well before the formal entry
of the CEECs into the EU (Landesmann, 2003).
2 The Bray-Curtis semi-metric – largely used in the natural sciences – is a bounded measure,
0& dxy& 1; it has the advantage of not increasing in the number of sectors considered, n; of
being invariant to proportional sub-classifications of the n sectors considered; it is not
subject to the double-zeros paradox; it lessens the effect of the largest differences since
difference in high sectoral export shares contribute the same as differences between small
sectoral export shares; and is appropriate in the presence of skewed distributions. Therefore
dxy has been selected as our preferred choice. We also make use of the linear correlation
index rxy in the multivariate regression in order to verify the robustness of the empirical
evidence to different measures of similarity.
3 A standard approach would be ‘to cut’ the bivariate kernels at equally spaced heights
regardless of the ‘depth’ of the observations; in the present case, the contours have been
carefully drawn in order to contain specific proportions of the dataset. The contour labeled
‘75’ contains the 75 per cent of the observations, and similarly for the contours labeled ‘50’
and ‘25’.
4 The Sachs & Warner – Wacziarg & Welch index (SW-WW) classifies countries as open if
they satisfy all the following five criteria: (1) the average of unweighted tariffs in the 1990 –
1999 period is lower than 40 per cent; (2) the average of core non-tariff barriers on capital
goods and intermediates is lower than 40 per cent; (3) the average black market premium
over the period is lower than 20 per cent; (4) the country does not have an export marketing
board; and (5) the country is not socialist.
5 A possible alternative is to use country fixed or random effects, but since our emphasis (as
will be shown) is on the use of a semi-parametric regression, in order to give robust evidence
of the nonlinear effect of EU-similarity on the catch-up of CEECs, and since, as pointed out
by a referee, the literature on fixed and random effect semi-parametric regression is not
thoroughly developed and proper tests to discriminate between fixed and random effects
alternatives are still unavailable, we opted for a simpler functional form with a country
categorical predictor, so as to allow for comparison of parametric and semi-parametric
regressions.
6 The exclusion of potentially collinear variables (not shown) increases the significance of the
country dummy parameter, increasing the F value of the regression.
7 Since there is a presumption of a serial correlation in openness we also used the first
difference of the variable as an instrument. In this case the magnitude of the coefficients
changes, but the sign and the significance remain stable.
8 The parameter estimate for EU-correlation is substantially lower than the one for EU-
similarity; the explanation lies on the insensitiveness of the correlation index to specific
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relative changes in the export structure of countries. The disadvantages in the use of the
Pearson correlation index as a measure of similarity in trade structures are discussed in De
Benedictis and Tajoli (2007).
9 Diagnostics have been applied to the functional form of regression (12) with positive results.
10 Splines are piece-wise polynomial functions that fit together at ‘knots’ (Hastie & Tibshirani,
1999: 22); for cubic splines – as in our case – the first and second derivatives are also
continuous at the knots.
11 Smoothing splines arise as the solution to the following simple-regression problem: find the
function f^ðxÞ with two continuous derivatives that minimizes the penalized sum of squares,
SS'ðhÞ ¼Pni¼1 yi " fðxiÞ½ )2 þ R xmaxxmin f00 ðxiÞ! "2dx where h is a smoothing parameter. The first
term in the previous equation is the residual sum of squares. The second term is a roughness
penalty, which is large when the integrated second derivative of the regression function f
00 ðxÞ
is large – that is, when f(x) is rapidly changing slope. The endpoints of the integral enclose
the data.
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Appendix – Data sources
Export composition is calculated using data from Eurostat, Comext database
on Intra and extra EU trade, adopting the Combined Nomenclature
classification.
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Openness is calculated as exportsþ imports/GDP using data from Eurostat,
Statistics in Focus, or alternatively is the openness dummy from Sachs and
Warner (1995) updated by Wacziarg and Welch (2003).
Income gap between the CEECs and the EU is calculated as the ratio between
the CEEC GDP per capita and the average EU-15 GDP per capita both in
PPS, taken from Eurostat, Statistics in Focus, Economy and Finance.
Gross capital formation is taken from Eurostat, Statistics in Focus.
Population is taken from Eurostat, Statistics in Focus.
Schooling refers to the percentage of population with secondary education in
1993 (or initial available year) and it is taken from ILO Laborsta database.
The Transition index is taken from the EBRD, Transition report 2000.
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